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1. Introduction 
During the past decade the hospital industry introduced profound organizational changes, 
including the extensive consolidation of hospitals through the mergers and formation of 
hospital systems. In addition, faced with falling profit margins, hospital industry saw an 
unprecedented wave of hospital closures and loss in operative capacity (Hsia et al. 2011). 
Both trends tend to decrease the existing competitive pressures for hospitals in the market.  
This Chapter will investigate whether changes in competition in hospital markets tangibly 
affect health outcomes as measured by risk adjusted mortality rates after coronary artery 
bypass grafting (CABG) surgery. In this kind of surgery, a vein or artery from another part 
of the body is used to create a new path for blood to flow to the heart, bypassing the blocked 
artery. Since CABG is typically not an emergency but a scheduled procedure, hospital 
competition (based on health outcomes) is more likely to affect mortality rates and other 
measures of quality than in emergency cases where both the patients and treating 
physicians have limited hospital choices.  
Economic theory predicts that concentration of market power leads to higher prices. This may 
or may not hold true in the healthcare industry due to the prevalence of public insurance, 
managed care pressures, as well as the prevalence of nonprofit hospitals. Moreover, higher 
hospital prices may signal higher quality. Thus, policy makers’ attempts to make health care 
markets more competitive and to depress reimbursements may not necessarily lead to welfare 
improvements. The study results in this Chapter will contribute to the existing literature by 
shedding more light on the relationship between hospital competition and health outcomes as 
measured by risk adjusted mortality rates. If hospitals located in less competitive markets 
exhibit inferior health outcomes, then the case for promoting competition through antitrust 
enforcement and support of failing hospitals is strengthened. 
2. Background 
2.1 Existing literature 
Previous literature does not provide a clear guidance as to the effects of hospital competition 
on health outcomes. For example, Propper et al. (2004) examined the relationship between 
hospital competition and mortality rates after emergency acute myocardial infraction (AMI). 
They find that higher competitive pressures in Britain’s National Health Service actually 
increased mortality rates for AMI after controlling for patient mix and other observed 
characteristics of the hospital and its market area. Similarly, using a longer panel of 
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hospitals Propper et al. (2008) find a negative relationship between hospital competition and 
AMI mortality but they find that competition does decrease waiting times. The study 
concludes that hospitals in UK decreased unobservable dimensions of quality (such as 
patient outcomes) but improved observed waiting times. On the other hand, Shortell and 
Hughes (1988), Ho and Hamilton (2000) find no significant relationship between hospital 
competition and hospital quality. For example, Ho and Hamilton (2000) found that mergers 
increased 90-day readmission rates and early discharges for newborns for Mei-Cal patients 
but did not affect inpatient mortality rates.  
In contrast to above mentioned findings, Sari (2002) and Kessler and McClellan (2000) show 
that hospital competition improves health outcomes along several important quality 
dimensions. Unlike UK studies above, Kessler and McClellan (2000) examined the effect of 
competition on AMI outcomes for Medicare patients and found higher AMI mortality rates 
when competition for Medicare patients decreased. Most recently, Gaynor and colleagues 
(2011) estimated the effect of moving from a market with 2.5 hospitals to one with 5 hospitals 
and find that such improvement in competition would result in about 55,000 more life years.  
It is important to note that different patients may be affected differently by competition. 
Kessler and Geppert (2005) examined the effect of hospital competition on more and less 
severely ill patients. They show that higher competitive pressures improve health outcomes 
(and lead to higher costs of treatment) for severely ill patients but do not affect less severely 
ill patients. Finally, Gowrisankaran and Town (2003) and Schneider (2008) have found that 
hospital competition improves quality but these quality improvements are not always 
realized depending on Medicare penetration and hospital ownership status.  
2.2 Importance of the study 
CABG surgery is the most common surgical procedure for treating cardiovascular disease. 
Coronary artery disease is the leading cause of all adult non-maternal admissions to 
California hospitals, representing nearly 9% of all admissions (OSHPD). This study 
contributes to the existing research along several dimensions. First, we focus on 30 day 
mortality rates and risk adjusted mortality rates following CABG surgery, while the 
previous literature for this surgery only examined in-hospital mortality rates (Schneider 
2008). Second, we use the hospital quality data from the time period when such reporting 
became mandatory rather than voluntary. Thus, relative to previous literature based on 
OSHPD data, there is less scope for hospital self-selection since all high and low quality 
hospitals have to report their mortality statistics to OSHPD. Lastly, the study attempts to 
examine the relationship between hospital-specific changes in CABG mortality rates and 
changes in market competition. We hope to gage whether changes in competitive pressures 
are responsible for changes in mortality statistics across hospitals.  
3. Methods 
Empirical model and data sources are presented below. 
3.1 Empirical model 
The following model is used in this study: 
www.intechopen.com
 
Can Competition Save Your Life? 157 
  log	ሺ∆ܧܯ௜ሻ௡௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵሺ∆ܪܪܫሻ௜ + ߚଶሺܪ݋ݏ݌݅ݐ݈ܽሻ௜ + ߚଷሺ∆ܯܽݎ݇݁ݐሻ௜ + ߙ௜ + ߝ௜   (1) 
where ∆EM represents changes in excess mortality between 2007 and 2003 for hospital i. 
Excess mortality is defined as the ratio between the observed mortality rate and the 
predicted rate. We estimate (1) using generalized linear model (GLM) separately for excess 
mortality and risk adjusted mortality rate relative to the state average.  
Coefficient of interest is 1  where HHI represents Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) that 
measures hospital competition; the index is constructed based on available bed shares and 
CABG volume, to test whether our results are sensitive to the product definition. HHI is 
inversely related to competition and therefore we expect lower HHI to decrease excess 
mortality if competition indeed saves lives. We use hospital service area (HSA) as the relevant 
hospital market. Unlike market definitions based on geo-political borders (e.g., county), the 
HSA relies on patient flows.  
It is important to note that HHI can be calculated based on patient flows as well as political 
boundaries (such as county or MSA). However, a recent study by Wong et al. (2005) 
calculated hospital competition index using county, MSA, health service area (as done in 
this study), fixed radius and variable radius measures. They found that the method of 
constructing HHI did not affect their estimates of the effect of competition on hospital costs. 
We believe that our two alternative measures of HHI will capture the effect of competition 
on patient outcomes although the magnitude of the effect may be different, as was found by 
Wong et al. (2005).  
We also control for hospital characteristics and other market characteristics, as follows: the 
hospital characteristics include ownership, church affiliation, teaching status, hospital size, 
ER, trauma unit and disproportionate share hospital status. Hospital size is measured as the 
number of staffed beds. Teaching status is defined as hospitals with some residents. We do 
control for the disproportionate share hospital status since hospitals with such designation 
serve a disproportionately high number of medically indigent patients. Hospital market 
characteristics reflect competitive pressures (HHI), area characteristics (percent uninsured 
and per capital income) and demand for community benefits (percent MediCal enrollment).  
3.2 Data 
This study uses hospital data from the Hospital Annual Financial Disclosure Reports filed 
annually by all California hospitals with the Office of Statewide Health Planning and 
Development (OSHPD). Hospital data will be merged with risk adjusted mortality rates that 
are based on the California Coronary Artery Bypass Graft (CABG) Mortality Reporting 
Program (CCMRP). Mortality rates are adjusted for patient characteristics: age, gender, body 
mass index, acuity (elective, urgent, emergent or salvage) as well as for the secondary 
conditions (such as hypertension, diabetes, etc.). Two mortality rates have been calculated. 
Observed mortality rate is the ratio of the number of deaths and the CABG cases multiplied 
by 100. Expected mortality rate is the ratio of the number of expected deaths to CABG cases 
multiplied by 100; expected mortality rate is risk adjusted. In this study we calculate excess 
mortality as the ratio of observed to expected mortality rate. When excess mortality ratio is 
greater than 1.0, that indicates that there were more deaths at the hospital than would have 
been expected. A ratio less than 1.0 indicates that there were fewer deaths at a hospital than 
expected, given the case mix of patients treated at a hospital (CCMRP). Finally, we use risk 
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adjusted mortality rate which is obtained by multiplying the observed annual California 
state average mortality rate by a hospital’s excess mortality ratio for that year.  
In this study we used 479 California general acute care hospitals in 2003 and 456 hospitals in 
2007 to compute HHI based on available beds. Then we reduced our sample to CABG 
performing hospitals to calculate HHI based on CABG surgeries. This definition of hospital 
competition uses a more narrow market definition since hospitals are assumed to compete 
only with other CABG performing hospitals. For our regression analysis, our sample was 
reduced to 109 hospitals that were performing CABG in both 2003 and 2007.  
 
Variable 
Mean 
(St. deviation)
Minimum Maximum 
Excess mortality in 2003 
1.0869 
(0.687) 
0 3.0372 
Excess mortality in 2007 
1.0570 
(0.955) 
0 7.457 
Differences in excess mortality (2003-2007) 
0.00936 
(1.062) 
-4.419 2.154 
Risk adjusted mortality rate, 2003 
3.156 
(1.995) 
0 8.81 
Risk adjusted mortality rate, 2007 
2.463 
(2.246) 
0 17.52 
Differences in risk adjusted mortality rates 
(2003-2007) 
0.621 
(2.685) 
-8.71 6.26 
HHI, based on available beds, 2003 
790.939 
(621.272) 
177.818 2545.682 
HHI, based on available beds, 2007 
603.411 
(355.959) 
181.108 1235.981 
HHI differences, HHI based on available beds 
(2003-2007) 
185.611 
(344.853) 
-111.175 1352.938 
HHI, based on CABG volume, 2003 
2297.811 
(2058.170) 
633.475 7847.276 
HHI, based on CABG volume, 2007 
1783.738 
(1204.323) 
613.0733 5235.165 
HHI differences, HHI based on CABG volume 
(2003-2007) 
512.0731 
(1393.311) 
-331.8247 5252.218 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Selected Variables  
Table 1 shows that on average the hospitals in California experienced a decrease in both 
excess mortality and risk adjusted mortality rates between 2003 and 2007. Since our 
dependent variable measures the differences in excess mortality between 2003 and 2007, the 
higher the difference the greater the fall in excess mortality and risk adjusted mortality rates. 
Thus, our dependent variables measure improvements in health outcomes.  
Between 2003 and 2007 the number of hospitals in California decreased by 4.8%. Although 
some hospitals saw an increase in competition and some hospitals saw a decrease in 
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competition, on average the hospital competition index actually decreased between 2003 and 
2007. This decrease indicates that hospital markets became more competitive despite the 
decrease in the number of hospitals that operate in California and this holds true for both 
measures of hospital competition. Since HHI does not simply measure the number of hospitals 
but rather hospital market shares, this means that with fewer hospitals in the market hospital 
shares became more equal. In this study we look at differences between 2003 and 2007; the 
higher the difference, the higher the increase in competition for the hospital market.  
If competitive pressures indeed improve health outcomes, we expected changes in HHI to 
have a positive effect on changes in health outcomes.  
4. Empirical results 
Our regression results are presented in Table 2 below.  
Empirical results indicate that higher competitive pressures translate into better health 
outcomes as measured by decreases in excess mortality as well as decreases in risk adjusted 
mortality rates relative to the state average. Results are statistically significant at the 10% 
level for most specifications of the model. Although hospitals in the United States may not 
compete based on price due to high prevalence of public insurance and high prevalence of 
nonprofit hospitals in the industry, competition based on quality may be relatively more 
important, especially as public insurance coverage is being expanded after the passage of 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010.  
Other important variables include hospital ownership status. Although there is no 
statistically significant relationship between mortality rates in for-profit and nonprofit 
hospitals, the nonprofit hospitals saw the same or smaller improvements in mortality than 
for-profits between 2003 and 2007. Municipal hospitals (city and county hospitals) show 
higher risk adjusted mortality rates and Table 2 shows that they saw smaller improvements 
in mortality rates even after we controlled for CABG volume and area characteristics.  
Although we do not see a statistically significant relationship between CABG volume and 
health outcomes, alternative specifications of the volume variable yield a better fit. For 
example, square root of volume has a statistically positive effect on mortality improvements 
(result not shown). This indicates that initial increases in CABG volume improve outcomes 
but this improvement, interestingly, increases at a decreasing rate. We also did not find a 
significant relationship between increases in the number of CABG surgeries performed and 
mortality statistics. This result is consistent with the previous research that shows that over 
time, the disparity in outcomes between low- and high-volume hospitals has narrowed as 
outcomes have improved significantly for all hospitals (Ho, 2000).  
Finally, the effect of hospital competition on health outcomes can be ambiguous since higher 
competitive pressures may potentially decrease the volume of surgeries that each hospital 
performs. If higher-volume hospitals, in fact, deliver better quality of care, competition may 
be undesirable. In our model we measure the effect of hospital competition holding CABG 
volume constant. Thus, we re-estimate our model without the effect of CABG volume. We 
find that even in this specification of the model the relationship between the hospital 
competition (as measured by HHI) holds.  
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Variable Excess 
mortality 
differences 
(2003-2007) 
Excess 
mortality 
differences 
(2003-2007) 
Risk adjusted 
mortality rates 
differences 
(2003-2007) 
Risk adjusted 
mortality rates 
differences 
(2003-2007) 
Competition measures 
HHI differences, HHI 
based on available beds 
(2003-2007) 
0.000657* 
(0.000397) 
- 
0.00170* 
(0.000995) 
 
HHI differences, HHI 
based on CABG volume 
(2003-2007) 
- 
0.000135 
(0.0000978) 
 
0.000361* 
(0.00220) 
Hospital Characteristics 
CABG volume -0.160 
(0.138) 
-0.138 
(0.138) 
-0.455 
(0.345) 
-0.397 
(0.345) 
Staffed beds 0.295 
(0.243) 
0.372 
(0.242) 
0.915 
(0.607) 
1.114* 
(0.607) 
Church affiliation 0.564 
(0.380) 
0.696* 
(0.371) 
1.562* 
(0.950) 
1.908** 
(0.930) 
Nonprofit, investor owned -0.473 
(0.304) 
-0.509* 
(0.304) 
-1.199 
(0.761) 
-1.295* 
(0.761) 
Nonprofit, other -0.864 
(0.706) 
-0.735 
(0.712) 
-2.434 
(1.766) 
-2.106 
(1.784) 
Municipal -0.993** 
(0.452) 
-1.074** 
(0.451) 
-2.490** 
(1.131) 
-2.702** 
(1.129) 
Trauma unit 0.0868 
(0.126) 
0.0885 
(0.126) 
0.231 
(0.314) 
0.235 
(0.316) 
Emergency room -0.205 
(0.426) 
-0.244 
(0.428) 
-0.608 
(1.0668) 
-0.709 
(1.071) 
Teaching 0.0887 
(0.125) 
0.0810 
(0.126) 
0.180 
(0.314) 
0.160 
(0.314) 
Disproportionate share 
hospital 
-0.199 
(0.265) 
-0.242 
(0.267) 
-0.389 
(0.663) 
-0.498 
(0.668) 
Market characteristics 
Uninsured -0.483 
(0.829) 
-0.0440 
(0.841) 
-1.265 
(2.074) 
-0.133 
(2.107) 
Per capital income 0.275 
(0.604) 
0.293 
(0.609) 
0.718 
(1.511) 
0.756 
(1.525) 
Percent Medical 0.157 
(0.155) 
0.0228 
(0.131) 
0.358 
(0.389) 
0.00774 
(0.329) 
Constant -3.899 
(8.567) 
-3.611 
(8.584) 
-10.434 
(21.438) 
-9.623 
(21.499) 
Notes: * indicates significance at p<0.1 level, ** indicates significance at p< 0.05 level. All continuous 
variables are in the log form.  
Table 2. Determinants of excess mortality differences (standard errors are in parentheses) 
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5. Limitations of the study 
In this study we concentrate only on clinical outcomes as measured by risk adjusted 
mortality rates. Previous research by Gaynor and Vogt (2000) point out that patient and 
physician preferences may be the driving force in hospital competition. In response to 
patient preferences, some hospitals may compete along both clinical and nonclinical 
dimensions. Some hospitals may respond to competitive pressures by offering private 
rooms with televisions and private phones, hotel-like lobbies and waiting rooms (Lindrooth 
2008). Improvements in such amenities may be important to patients but they are not 
addressed in this study.  
6. Conclusions and policy implications 
This study estimates the effect of changes in hospital competition on risk adjusted measures 
of hospital outcomes as measured by risk adjusted mortality rates. Using the data from the 
Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development of the State of California for the 
period 2003-2007 we find that hospitals that saw higher competitive pressures also 
experienced greater improvements in health outcomes as measured by mortality statistics 
following Coronary Artery Bypass Graft (CABG) surgery. Although higher competition in 
hospital markets may not affect health care prices due to the presence of the third-party 
payers, it does translate into quality competition and better health outcomes. 
A review of health care consolidation trends by Goldberg (1999) indicates that consolidation 
is likely to continue at a rapid pace. Such consolidation can have a negative effect on health 
outcomes if it leads to increases in market power. Results of this study show that a decrease 
in the number of hospitals may not necessarily decrease hospital competition index as 
measured by HHI. Increases in HHI (i.e. decreases in hospital competition) significantly 
decrease quality of care as measured by risk adjusted mortality rates. In addition, Dranove 
and White (1994) estimated a trend beginning in the mid-1980s in which higher hospital 
competition lowered prices and cost of care. Similar results were found by Gaynor and 
Haas-Wilson (1999) and Keeler et al. (1999). Mounting empirical evidence leads us to 
conclude that hospital competition improves quality of care and lowers cost of care and 
prices, thus improving patient welfare.  
Our results imply that overtime both technological improvements and antitrust policies will 
play a role in determining improvements in hospital quality. Antitrust analysis of the 
hospital industry should incorporate the potential effects of pro-competitive policies on 
health outcomes since such policies may in fact save lives.  
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